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WORKERS' COMPENSATION - Following A Spouse to a New
Locality: Mississippi's Benefit Disqualification Statute - Warren
v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Security Commission,
463 So. 2d 1076 (Miss. 1985)
I. FACTS
On July 31, 1983, Phoebe Warren moved to the state of Flori-
da to join her husband, who had been recently transferred by the
United States Army. Although Warren had signed an employment
contract for the following school year, she resigned from this po-
sition, and when her previous twelve-month contract ended in Au-
gust, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits.
This general claim of entitlement was disallowed by the Missis-
sippi Employment Security Commission both initially and by the
Appeals Referee. Warren subsequently appealed to the Commis-
sion's Board of Review, claiming that her husband's transfer pur-
suant to military orders rendered her resignation involuntary,
thereby meeting the requirement of good cause. Mississippi Code
Annotated § 71-5-513(A)(1)(a) (1972 & Supp. 1986) provides that,
"marital, filial, and domestic circumstances and obligations shall
not be deemed good cause [for termination of employment]." Af-
ter the Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeals
Referee, appeal was made to the circuit court, which, without
hearing, affirmed the decision of the Board of Review. In appeal-
ing to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Mrs. Warren argued
that the statute establishes a class of claimants who are prevented
from demonstrating that marital, filial and domestic circumstances
could constitute good cause.' By contrast, claimants quitting work
for other reasons can argue good cause.2 Thus the statute estab-
lishes a classification which bears no rational relationship to a
legitimate legislative purpose, thereby violating the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the United States Constitution.'
The Mississippi Employment Security Commission responded
by noting that the "irrebuttable presumption"' doctrine had, since
I. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, 8, Warren v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n,
463 So. 2d 1076 (1985).
2. See supra note I, at 2, 8.
3. See supra note 1, at 2-3, 8.
4. An "irrebuttable presumption" is a statutory provision which operates in such a manner as to classify
people for the imposition of a burden or benefit without an initial determination of the merits of individual
claims. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNG, CONSTITUTtONAL LAW 553 (2nd ed. 1983). Such presumptions
violate due process because they either deprive one of a benefit or establish a burden without fair process of
law. Id. By arguing that the statute establishes a class of claimants who are prevented from demonstrating
that marital, filial and domestic circumstances can constitute good cause for termination, Mrs. Warren main-
tained that she was irrebuttably presumed to have terminated employment without good cause, in violation
of her right to due process of law.
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1975, been abandoned by the United States Supreme Court ex-
cept in cases where "fundamental interests" were involved.' Ap-
pellee also estimated that $1.8 million was saved by the statute
annually, thus preserving the integrity of the state's Unemploy-
ment Trust Fund.6 In conclusion, appellee argued that the law in
question was adopted by the legislature for a good and reasona-
ble purpose, that it infringed upon no claimant's constitutional
rights, and that its plain language was correctly applied to the facts
of the present case."
Writing for the court, Justice Hawkins found that the legisla-
ture was the policymaker in determining whether or not it would
deny benefits to persons choosing to accompany their spouses to
another locality.' While hardships might occasionally arise, the
Mississippi marital disqualification statute did not offend any con-
stitutional guarantee under the equal protection or due process
provisions of the state and federal constitutions.'
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. The Problem
Some states have statutes which specifically disqualify a claim-
ant from receiving unemployment compensation benefits where
resignation stems from following a spouse to a new locality."°
When challenged, four modes of analysis have been consistently
utilized regarding such statutes." One view holds that if the dis-
qualification bears some rational relationship to the legitimate
legislative purpose of providing benefits to the involuntarily un-
employed, then it will not offend the equal protection clause."
S. Appellee's Reply Brief at 6, Warren v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n,
463 So. 2d 1076 (1985).
6. See supra note 5, at II.
7. See supra note 5, at 12.
8. Warren v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 463 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (1985).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-1366 (Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(A)(I)(a) (Supp. 1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(a) (Supp. 1986).
11. See infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
12. Kistler v. Indus. Comm'n, 556 P.2d 895, 897-98 (Colo. 1976); Pyeatt v. Idaho State University, 98
Idaho 424, 426, 565 P.2d 1381, 1383 (1977); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Board of Review of Dep't of Labor,
413 II1. 37, 43, 107 N.E. 2d 832, 835 (1952); Shelton v. Phalen, 214 Kan. 54, 59, 519 P.2d 754, 758-59
(1974); Petterssenv, CommnofEmploymettServ., 306 Minn. 542,544,236 N.W.2d 168, t69 (t975); Kan-
tor v. Honeywell, Inc., 286 Minn. 29, 32, 175 N.W.2d 188, 190-91 (1970); Warren v. Board of Review of
Miss. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 463 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Miss. 1985); Wallace v. Commonwealth Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 38 Pa. Commw. 342, 347-51, 393 A.2d 43, 46-47 (1978); Guinn
v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 33 Pa. Commw. 596, 599-600, 382 A.2d
503, 504-05 (1978); Gilman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 630, 634-36,
369 A.2d 895, 897-99 (1977); Chandler v. Department of Employment Sec., 678 P.2d 315, 317-18 (Utah
1984); Thomas v. Rutledge, 280 S.E.2d 123, 127-30 (W. Va. 1981).
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The more rigorous species of equal protection analysis holds that
the statute's disparate impact upon females renders it vulnerable
to strict judicial scrutiny, which generates a higher probability
of invalidity.1 Similarly, freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life has been considered a fundamental
liberty, the denial of which may also trigger strict scrutiny."1 By
penalizing an employed woman's decision to marry and to follow
her husband to another locality, the disqualification statute in-
fringes upon this fundamental right. 5 A final method of analysis
is based on the statute's conclusive presumption that one who ter-
minates employment for marital, filial or domestic reasons has
withdrawn from the labor market permanently.16 Denying claim-
ants an individualized determination of their entitlement to a
government benefit creates an irrebuttable presumption which vio-
lates due process. 7
B. Traditional Supreme Court Analysis
Although laws limiting fundamental rights are subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny, the normal standard of review is minimum ra-
tionality.8 Under this analysis, as long as a statutory classifica-
tion bears some rational relationship to a legitimate legislative goal,
it will pass muster under the equal protection and due process
clauses.9 The most striking application of the minimum rational-
ity standard occurred in Dandridge v. Williams," where the Court
upheld, on equal protection grounds, a Maryland welfare statute
which limited the number of children for which any family could
receive subsistence payments."
13. Boren v. California Dep't of Employment Dev., 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 257-61, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683,
687-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
14. Id. at 259-61, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 688-90.
15. Id. at 259, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
16. Shelton v. Phalen, 214 Kan. 54, 58-59, 519 P.2d 754, 758 (1974); Thomas v. Rutledge, 280 S.E.2d
123, 128-29 (W. Va. 1981).
17. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAl, LAW 553 (2d ed. 1983).
18. id. at 821-22.
19. Id.
20. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
21. While the Court had previously reserved this minimum rationality standard for cases involving the state
regulation of business or industry, it found no reason for withholding the analysis here because "the administra-
tion of public welfare assistance involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings." Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 41, 486 (1970).
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart stated that a sufficient foundation for the regulation existed in the
state's legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in avoiding discrimination between welfare families
and the families of the working poor. Id. at 486. Although he conceded that these objectives would occasional-
ly not be met, Justice Stewart cited Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), for the
proposition that the equal protection clause did not command a state to choose between attacking every aspect
of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. Rather, it was sufficient that the state's action be rationally
based and free from invidious discrimination. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87.
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Historically, sex-based classifications were treated exactly as
were general economic regulations." However, after the repudi-
ation of substantive due process, all economic and social welfare
legislation was awarded great deference." Independent judicial
review was triggered only by the presence of a fundamental right
or suspect class." However, in the 1971 case of Reed v. Reed,"5
the court independently reviewed a sexually discriminatory stat-
ute without declaring sex to be a suspect classification.' Five years
later, the Court, in Craig v. Boren, 7 formally defined an inter-
mediate level of review known as the "substantial relationship to
an important state interest" standard.2
Standing in stark contrast to the usual rational basis standard
is a line of cases in which the Supreme Court adopted an irrebut-
table presumption analysis. Vlandis v. Kline, 9 the first in this series
of cases, involved a Connecticut statute"0 which permanently
barred a non-resident student from becoming an in-state resident
in order to receive lower tuition rates within the state university
system. Speaking for the majority, Justice Stewart stated that ir-
rebuttable presumptions were forbidden by the due process clause
when "not necessarily or universally true in fact."'" Instead, the
state must allow an opportunity to present evidence showing bona
fide residency. 2
22. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 714 (2d ed. 1983).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
26. Id. at 74-77. Although sex-based classifications were no longer shown the deference granted economic
regulations, neither were they subject to the strict scrutiny focused upon truly suspect classifications such as
those based upon race. J. NOwA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 714 (2d ed. 1983)
27. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
28. Under this analysis, "[to withstand constitutional challenge, classifications by gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
29. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-329b (Supp. 1969) (as amended by Public Act. No. 5 § 126) (June Sess.
1971).
31. 412 U.S. at 452.
32. Id. Citing the difficulty of the determination and the expense of the administrative burden, the state
had contended that without a conclusive presumption, the prevention of fraudulent residence claims would be
impossible. 412 U.S. at 451. Rejecting this argument, the Court cited Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
for the proposition that the state's interest in administrative ease and certainty could not, by itself, justify a
conclusive presumption under the due process clause where other reasonable and practical means were availa-
ble to achieve the state's objective. 412 U.S. at 451.
Two weeks after the Supreme Court reached its decision in Vlandis, it was again faced with an irrebuttable
presumption in United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), a case in which a
federal food stamp provision disqualified a large class of households without an individualized determination
of need. The appellees had been denied food stamp eligibility because their households contained persons 18
years or older who had been claimed as "dependents" for federal income tax purposes by taxpayers ineligible
for food stamp relief. Id. at 511. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas noted that during the two-year
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period of ineligibility, the statute created a conclusive presumption that the "tax dependent's" household was
not needy and had access to nutritional adequacy. Id. Citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court
stated that although a simple tax dependeny test may promote administrative ease, the Bill of Rights and the
due process clause "were designed to protect the fragile values of vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize . . . government officials." 413 U.S. at 513-14. The
Court also found it incredulous that members of the household where the child resided were denied food stamps
regardless of their number, destitute circumstances, or lack of relation to the deducting parent. Id. at 514.
In its conclusion the majority stated that:
the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need
of a different household with which the child of a tax-deducting parent lives and rests on an irrebuttable
presumption often contrary to fact. It therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process ....
Id.
As Nowak Rotunda and Young have observed, Justice White's concurrence in Vlandis noted that a process
would not have saved the requirement under an equal protection analysis because such a procedure would only
have determined whether an individual fell within the arbitrary residence classification. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUN-
DA & J. YouNG, CO NSTITUTIONAL LAW 553 (2d ed. 1983) citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,457-58 (1973).
For him, it was sufficient that the interest involved was higher education, that the difference between in-state
and out-of-state tuition was substantial, and that, in the name of administrative convenience, a burden was
imposed without the posibility of an administrative hearing. Id. at 457-59.
In his dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger stated that the majority had "accomplish[ed]
a transferrence [sic] of the elusive and arbitrary 'compelling state interest' concept into the orbit of the Due
Process Clause . . . [thereby making] an uncharted drift toward complications ... comparable in scope and
seriousness with those we are encountering in the equal protection area." Id. at 460-62. Chief Justice Burger
concluded by stating that "[although] the urge to cure every disadvantage human beings can experience exerts
an inexorable pressure to expand judicial doctrine . . . .that urge should not move the Court to erect standards
that are unrealistic and indeed unexplained for evaluating the constitutionality of state statutes." Id. at 463.
Apparently agreeing with Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Vlandis, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting
in United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, quoted Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
6 (1911), for the proposition that, "[i]n the area of economics and social welfare . . . [ilf the classification
has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the [equal protection clause] . . . simply because [it] 'is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" 413 U.S. at 523-24. Distin-
guishing the present statute as "a duly enacted prophylactic limitation on the dispensation of funds," Justice
Rehnquist maintained that the government had not employed a conclusive presumption so much as it had erect-
ed a substantive limitation designed to rectify abuses of the program. Therefore, Justice Rehnquist, with whom
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell concurred, would have upheld the statute as consistent with the due
process clause. Id. at 524-27.
One year later, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Supreme Court invali-
dated the mandatory maternity leave rules of two state school boards which required pregnant teachers to quit
their jobs without pay several months before giving birth. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart observed
that by penalizing the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, the restrictive provisions heavily burdened
the exercise of freedom of choice in matters of marriage and family life, one of the fundamental liberties pro-
tected by the due process clause. Id. at 639-40. While the Court conceded that continuity of instruction was
a significant and legitimate state interest, it found that the arbitrary cutoff dates bore no rational relationship
to this goal. Id. at 642-44. The state also contended that the mandatory leave was necessary to eliminate physi-
cally incapable teachers from the classroom. Id. at 643. Although the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of
this objective and assumed arguendo that some teachers did become physically unfit to teach during the latter
stages of pregnancy, it found that the mandatory leave provisions amounted to a conclusive presumption of
incapacity once the point was reached. Because there was no individualized medical determination of the teacher's
fitness to continue at her job, the Court held that the rules contained an irrebuttable presumption of physical
incompetency Id. at 644, which was wholly arbitrary and an irrational violation of the due process clause Id.
at 650.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell expressed dissatisfaction with the majority's return to the irrebutta-
ble presumption analysis, stating that "the concept at root often will be . . . [the equal protection clause] masquer-
ading as a due process doctrine." Id. at 652. Preferring the application of the rational-basis standard of equal
protection review, Justice Powell would have invalidated the regulations as creating irrational classifications
which addressed the school board's objectives in an excessively attenuated manner. Id. at 654-56. He also not-
ed that it was "difficult to see the terminus of the road upon which the Court [had] embarked," as stringent
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The irrebuttable presumption doctrine was virtually abandoned
in Weinberger v. Salfi,3" a case which upheld eligibility classifi-
cations of surviving spouses and stepchildren under the Social
Security Act based on the duration of their relationship to a de-
ceased wage earner."4 The Weinberger court found that the proper
test was whether Congress could have rationally concluded that
a particular limitation would guard against a possible abuse, and
that the expense and difficulty of individualized determinations
justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule. 5 Apply-
ing this analysis, the Court held that the duration-of-relationship
requirement represented a substantive policy determination that
benefits should be awarded solely to genuine marital relationships
and that limited resources would be foolishly spent in making in-
dividual determinations36
III. THE VARIOUS STATES' TREATMENTS
OF THE MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION
A. Introduction to the Various Statutes
Although all marital disqualification statutes share the common
purpose of denying benefits to those who quit work for marital,
insistence upon individualized treatment could prove impractical in large school districts with thousands of
teachers. Id. at 652.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger, blasted Justice Stewart for "enlist[ing] the Court
in another quixotic engagement in his apparently unending war on irrebuttable presumptions, Id. at 657, and
found his myopic preference for individualized determinations "nothing less than an attack upon the very no-
tion of lawmaking itself' Id. at 660.
One year later, in Turner V. Depatimeit of Unemployment, 423 U.S. 44 (1975), the CWou( was faced with
a Utah statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(h)(1) (1953), which declared a pregnant woman ineligible for em-
ployment benefits from twelve weeks before the expected birth until six weeks after. In a per curiam opinion,
the Court stated that "[tihe fourteenth amendment requires that unemployment compensation boards no less than
school boards must achieve legitimate state ends through more individualized means when basic human liber-
ties are at stake." 423 U.S. at 46.
33. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
34. Id. at 781-85. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that:
the District Court's extension of the holdings of Stanley, l'landis, and La Fleur to the eligibility require-
ment in issue here would turn the doctrine of those cases into a virtual engine of destruction for countless
legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution . . . This would represent a degree of judicial involvement in the legis-
lative function which we have eschewed except in the most unusual circumstances ....
422 U.S. at 772-73.
35. Id. at 777. Because the nine-month duration of relationship requirement obviated the necessity for large
numbers of individualized determinations and sheltered those satisfying the criterion from the interminable
vagueries of administrative inquiry into their marriages, the majority held that Congress could have rationally
charted such a course. Id. at 781-82. In addition, the Court feared that sham arrangements might escape detec-
tion since neither marital intent, life expectancy, or knowledge of terminal illness are reliably demonstrable.
Id. at 782-83. The Court also noted that the mere possibility of prevailing at a hearing, could, in itself, en-
courage collusive marriages. Id. at 783.
36. Id. at 784.
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filial or domestic reasons, ' they vary in the degree to which they
accomplish this end38 and in the length of time the disqualifica-
tion remains in effect.3 9 Most statutes under constitutional challenge
were couched in sexually neutral terms,"° thus purporting to dis-
qualify both men and women with equal ease. However, some
statutes carved out an exception which drew a distinction between
persons providing primary and secondary family support.4' While
the primary breadwinner was immune from the statutory bar to
benefit eligibility, the secondary breadwinner remained vulnera-
ble to it.
42
Benefit ineligibility under these challenged statutes has been stat-
ed in several ways, including a specific disqualification for ter-
mination due to marital, filial or domestic circumstances,' leaving
work voluntarily and without good cause, a conclusive presump-
tion of unavailability 'S an irrebuttable presumption of withdraw-
al from the work force 6 and an irrebuttable presumption that cause
for termination was not of a necessitous and compelling nature.4 7
Regardless of how he or she is disqualified, once a person is
declared ineligible, most statutes require the claimant to demon-
strate that he or she has rejoined the labor market before becom-
37. For an overview of such statutes, see 76 AM. JUR. 2D Unemployment Compensation § 63 (1975). An-
notation, Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation as Affected by Voluntary Resignation Because of Change
of Location of Residence, 21 A.L.R. 4TH 317 (1983).
38. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
40. Boren v. California Dep't of Employment Dev., 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 253-54, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683,
684-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Kistler v. Indus. Comm'n, 556 P.2d 895, 896-97 (Colo. 1976); Pyeatt v. Idaho
State Univ., 98 Idaho 424,425-26, 565 P.2d 1381, 1382-83 (1977); Illinois Bel Tel. Co, v, Board of Review
of Dep't of Labor, 413 III. 37, 39-40, 107 N.E.2d 832, 833-34 (1952); Shelton v. Phalen, 214 Kan. 54, 56,
57, 519 P.2d 754, 756-57 (1974); Petterssen v. Comm'r of Employment Serv.. 306 Minn. 542, 543, 236 N.W.2d
168, 169 (1975); Warren v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 463 So. 2d 1076,
1077 (Miss. 1985); Wallace v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 38 Pa. Commw.
342, 345, 393 A.2d 43,44-45 (1978); Guinn v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
33 Pa. Commw. 596, 597-98, 382 A.2d 503, 503-04 (1978); Gilman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 630, 632-33. 369 A.2d 895, 896 (1977); Chandler v. Department of Employment
Sec., 678 P.2d 315, 316-17 (Utah 1984); Thomas v. Rutledge, 280 S.E.2d 123, 127 (W. Va. 1981). By con-
trast, the statute in Kantor v. Honeywell, Inc.. 286 Minn. 29, 31, 175 N.W. 188, 190 (1970), expressly target-
ed the female sex.
41. Boren, 59 Cal. App. 2d at 253-54, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 684-85; Pyeatt, 98 Idaho at 425, 565 P.2d at
1382; Guinn, 33 Pa. Commw. at 587-98, 382 A.2d at 503-04; Gilman, 28 Pa. Commw. at 632-33, 369 A.2d
at 896.
42. Boren, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 256, 130 Cal Rptr. at 687.
43. Petterssen, 306 Minn. at 543, 236 N.W.2d at 168; Kantor, 286 Minn. at 31, 175 N.W. at 190.
44. Boren, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 254, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 685; Pyeatt, 98 Idaho at 425-26, 565 P.2d at 1382-83,
Warren, 463 So. 2d at 1077; Guinn, 33 Pa. Commw. at 597-98, 382 A.2d at 504; Gilan, 28 Pa. Commw.
at 632-33, 369 A.2d at 896-97; Chandler, 687 P.2d at 316-17.
45. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 413 Ill. at 42, 107 N.E.2d at 834-35.
46. Shelton, 214 Kan. at 57-60, 519 P.2d at 757-59, Thomas, 280 S.E.2d at 127-28.
47. Wallace, 38 Pa. Commw. at 345-46, 393 A.2d at 44-45.
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ing eligible for benefits." This demonstration is accomplished by
the performance of certain requirements which vary in severity."
The most common way in which marital disqualification stat-
utes assess willingness to work and availability for employment
is by requiring re-employment for a specified period before eligi-
bility status is renewed.5" By contrast, in the benefit-multiple pro-
vision, the individuals are disqualified from eligibility until they
again become employed and earn wages totaling a certain multi-
ple of the weekly benefit amount. 1 Lower still on the spectrum
of severity is the method which prolongs the disqualification un-
til the claimant regains bona fide employment. 2 The most lenient
of all methods is that which holds that the presumption of voca-
tional unavailability shall not apply whenever the marital, filial
or domestic circumstance ceases to exist. 3 Underlying most un-
employment benefit statutes is the requirement that one be ac-
tively seeking and available for work.5
B. Modes of Analysis
Most state courts have upheld marital disqualification statutes
as bearing a reasonable and substantial relation to the legitimate
state end of providing benefits for the involuntarily unemployed.55
However, the court in Boren v. California Department of Em-
ployment Development"' applied a strict scrutiny analysis to in-
validate such a statute. 57 After a treatment of the cases which have
utilized a minimum rationality standard,58 the present discussion
will shift to Boren.
48. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
50. Kistler, 556 P.2d at 896 (work thirteen weeks in new employment); Petterssen, 306 Minn. at 543,
236 N.W.2d at 168-69; Kantor, 286 Minn at 31, 175 N.W. at 190 (work six weeks in new employment);
Thomas, 280 S.E.2d at 127 (work thirty days in new employment). These cases illustrate that the probationary
period method is also the most restrictive in that the temporal interval may not be varied or accelerated.
51. Shelton, 214 Kan. at 57, 519 P.2d at 757; Warren, 463 So. 2d 1076 (Miss. 1985), construing Miss.
CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(A)(l)(a) (1972 and Supp. 1985) which required wages of at least eight times their
weekly benefit amount. The benefit-multiple method allows acceleration of the temporal interval if wages un-
der resumed employment exceed those earned initially. Hence, the individual receiving a higher wage will
attain eligibility status sooner than a poorly paid worker.
52. Boren, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 253-54, 257, 260, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 684-85, 687, 689.
53. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 413 I11. at 39-40, 107 N.E.2d at 834. This method is not so much an assessment
device as it is a ceordition ssbsequemt which Iiggers the removal of the dsqsaificaoss provision.
54. Annotation, Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation as Affected by Voluntary Resignation Because
of Change of Location of Residence, 21 A.L.R. 4T" 317, 324 (1983). This criterion is designed to prevent
those lacking conscientious intent from abusing the unemployment compensation system.
55. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
56. 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
57. Id. at 257, 259-60, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 687-89.
58. See supra notes 12, 55 and accompanying text.
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1. Minimum Rationality
The only decision finding a marital disqualification statute to
lack a rational basis is that of Kistler v. Industrial Commission. 9
In that case, the Colorado statute0 provided that a worker who
terminated employment for marital, parental, filial or domestic
reasons would not be entitled to benefits received until, subse-
quent to the separation, they had worked for 13 weeks in full-
time employment within the benefit year.' By contrast, a 1971
amendment "' provided that an individual quitting for no reason
at all was only penalized by a 13-25 week delay in payment. 3
Because the statute offered benefits to those quitting for no rea-
son but denied benefits to those quitting because of family cir-
cumstances until they became re-employed, the court held it an
irrational and impermissible classification in violation of the equal
protection clause."6
Some state courts have found that their legislatures could
reasonably have determined that a woman so situated had volun-
tarily removed herself from the labor market and was therefore
not entitled to state funds." In Kantor v. Honeywell Inc. ," a Min-
nesota statute" expressly disqualified a woman who "discontinu[ed]
her employment to assume the duties of a housewife," yet the court
upheld it as meeting the requirements of equal protection.8 Five
years later, in Petterssen v. Commissioner of Employment Serv-
ices, 9 the same statute in amended form70 was upheld on the ad-
ditional ground that the provision was now sexually neutral.7 ' Both
59. 556 P.2d 895 (Colo. 1976).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108(8)(a) (1973 and Supp. 1985) (repealed by L. 84, § 6, effective July
I, 1984).
61. 556 P.2d at 896.
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108(2)(b)(I) (repealed and reenacted by L. 76, §§ 20, 12, 2) (1973 and Supp.
1985).
63. 556 P.2d at 897. While the court conceded the state's legitimate interest in limiting unemployment benefits
to conscientious individuals, it found such an interest adequately preserved by the statutory requirement that
one be actively seeking and available for employment in order to receive benefits. Id. at 898. Although the
state could deny benefits to those who voluntarily separated from employment, the court found that once the
state had chosen to provide some benefits under such circumstances, the scheme by which the benefits were
determined must have a rational basis. 556 P.2d at 897.
64. 556 P.2d at 898. In view of the case's disposition on these grounds, the claimant's due process objec-
tions were not considered. Id.
65. Pyeatt, 98 Idaho at 426, 565 P.2d at 1383; Petterssen, 306 Minn. at 544, 236 N.W.2d at 169; Kantor,
296 Minx. at 32, 175 N.W.2d at 190-91; Guinn, 33 Pa. Commw. at 599-600, 382 A.2d at 504; Gilman, 28
Pa. Commw. at 635-36, 369 A.2d at 897-98.
66. 268 Minn. 29, 175 N.W.2d 188 (1970).
67. MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 268.09 subd. 1(2) (West Suoo. 1985).
68. 286 Minn. at 32, 175 N.W.2d at 190-91.
69. 306 Minn. 542, 236 N.W.2d 168 (1975).
70. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09, subd. 1(2) (West Supp. 1985).
71. 306 Minn. at 544, 236 N.W.2d at 169.
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Kantor7 2 and Petterssen7" dismissed the contention that the clas-
sification was arbitrary because subsequent employment for a six-
week probationary period provided a reasonable means of remov-
ing the disqualification.
In Pyeatt v. Idaho State University,7 ' the statute7 contained both
neutral language7" and a primary provider exception.77 Although
the court conceded that legislative discretion was narrowed when
classifications were based upon suspect criteria, the provision was
found to be non-discriminatory since it employed the neutral term
"spouse."78 Upholding the statute, the Idaho court held the dis-
couragement of voluntary termination without good cause a ra-
tional means of encouraging employment stability.79
In Gilman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,8"
the primary provider exception8 of the Pennsylvania statute 2 was
attacked as discriminatory because husbands outnumbered wives
as sole or major family wage earners by a ratio of four to one.8"
Although the court conceded that men greatly outnumbered women
in the favored class, it found that numerical disparity alone was
insufficient to warrant characterizing the classification as sex-
based." Because the statutorily created classification was economic
rather than sexual,85 no suspect basis was found which warranted
strict judicial scrutiny.8" The court went on to find that the differ-
ent treatment accorded major and secondary family wage earn-
ers was justified by the fact that the family as a whole suffered
relatively more severe economic disruption from the unemploy-
ment of the major family wage earner. 7 Because the distinction
involved no invidious discrimination, the statute passed muster
72. 268 Minn. at 32, 175 N.W.2d at 191.
73. 306 Minn. at 544, 236 N.W.2d at 169.
74. 98 Idaho 424, 565 P.2d 1381 (1977).
75. IDAHO CODE § 72-1366 (1973 and Supp. 1985).
76. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
78. 98 Idaho at 425-26, 565 P.2d at 1382-83.
79. 98 Idaho at 426, 565 P.2d at 1383. Because no claim attacked the primary provider exception, it re-
mained unaddressed.
80. 28 Pa. Commw. 630, 369 A.2d 895 (1977).
81. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
2. Pp,. Smr. ANN. tit. 43, § 8602 (ftrdon 1964) (amendted 1974 by P.L. 769, No. 261, % 2).
83. 28 Pa. Commw. at 633, 369 A.2d at 896-97.
84. Id. at 634, 369 A.2d at 897.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 634-35, 369 A.2d at 897.
87. Id. at 635-36, 369 A.2d at 898. The fact that the classification might occasionally result in compensa-
tion for the 51 % breadwinner, but not for the one earning 49%, was not viewed as rendering the court's action
irrational or unrelated to its legitimate interest of protecting the unemployed from financial hardship. Id.
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under the equal protection clause."
As if to test the mettle of this holding, the subsequent Pennsyl-
vania case of Guinn v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review" presented a female claimant who had
earned only $200 less than her husband's yearly income of
$8,226.54," but was denied benefits under the statute9 because
she was not the "sole or major support" of her family .2 While
the claimant argued that the term "major support" should be in-
terpreted to mean an important or significant portion of the fami-
ly income," the court adhered to the Gilman standard by
interpreting "major support of the family" to mean a simple majori-
ty of the family's combined earnings."
2. Strict Scrutiny Triggered by Sex-Based Classifications
Another challenge to the constitutionality of marital disqualifi-
cation statutes is that they operate almost exclusively upon females,
in violation of equal protection. While this line of attack has
usually failed, a lone triumph occurred in Boren v. California
Department of Employment Development. 9 There, a female claim-
ant terminating employment for child-care purposes successfully
challenged a California statute." The statute distinguished between
a claimant who left work voluntarily for domestic reasons and
one who left work voluntarily but for good cause of another kind."
This statute also contained a primary provider exception99 and a
provision extending the disqualification of those quitting for
domestic reasons until they became re-employed. '
In its examination of these three classifications, the court stat-
ed that it would focus on the statute's practical impact rather than
88. 28 Pa. Commw. at 636, 369 A.2d at 898.
89. 33 Pa. Commw. 596, 382 A.2d 503 (1978).
90. 33 Pa. Commw. at 598, 382 A.2d at 504.
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 803 (Purdon 1964) (amended 1974 by P.L. 769, No. 261, § 2).
92. 33 Pa. Commw. at 598, 382 A.2d at 504.
93. Id. at 598-599, 382 A.2d at 504.
94. Id. at 599, 382 A.2d at 504.
95. Bqren v. California Dep't of Employment Dev., 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 253, 255, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683,
685-86 (1976); Pyeatt v. Idaho State Univ., 98 Idaho 424, 425-26, 565 P.2d 1381, 1382-83 (1977); Petterssen
v. Comm'r of Employment Serv., 306 Minn. 542, 544, 236 N.W.2d 168, 169 (1975); Kantor v. Honeywell,
Inc., 2866 Minn. 29, 32, 135 N.W.2d 118, 190 (19'10); ?uinn v. Commonwealth Unemploymem Compensa-
tion Bd. of Review 33 Pa. Commw. 596, 598-99, 382 A.2d 503,504 (1978); Gilman v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Bd. of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 630, 633, 369 A.2d 895, 896-97 (1977).
96. 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 130 Cal, Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
97. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1264 (West 1972).
98. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 256, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
99. Id. at 253-54, 256, 258, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 684-85, 687-88.
100. Id. at 253-54, 257, 260, 130 Cal. Rtpr. at 684-85, 687, 689.
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its neutral language. 1 ' Discrimination could be shown by statis-
tics depicting the statute's actual operation.0 2 Accordingly, the
petitioner presented data demonstrating that in 1971, 99% of the
claimants declared ineligible under the statute had been women. 11
It was also contended that due to cultural role patterns and a past
history of discrimination, American women bore a disproportion-
ate share of domestic duties, thus rendering them significantly
less able to contribute to family support than men.0 ' Although
the state argued that social and cultural patterns forced women
to leave work for the sake of domestic needs, 0 ' the court stated
that it was the statute which centered its adverse effect upon the
female claimant. 0 6 Because the sex-based disqualification rested
upon three suspect classifications, 0 7 and because no compelling
state interest was found, the statute was struck down as a denial
of equal protection. 0 8
3. Strict Scrutiny Triggered by Marriage as a Fundamental Right
A third challenge to the constitutionality of marital disqualifi-
cation statutes is founded on the premise that freedom of choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the fundamental
liberties protected by the due process clause.0 9 This was an addi-
tional reason that the California statute1 was vulnerable to strict
scrutiny in Boren."' Because the claimant's job termination had
been motivated by familial circumstances, the statute imposed a
harsher penalty than that borne by claimants who quit for other
kinds of good cause or who were not "able and available" for other
reasons. 2 Hence, the court found that "[a]n employed woman's
decision to marry, to follow her husband to another locality or
to leave work for childbirth or child care, falls within the ambit
of fourteenth amendment liberties." By contrast, the Colorado
court in Kistler v. Industrial Commission... refused to view a mar-
101. Id. at 256, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 256, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
104. Id. at 255-56, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86.
105. Id. at 257, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
106. Id. at 259, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
107. Id. at 257-58, t30 CaL Rptr, at 686-87,
108. Id. at 262, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
109. Id. at 259, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
110. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1264 (West 1972).
111. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
112. Id. at 260-61, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
113. Id. at 259, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
114. 192 Colo. 172, 174, 556 P.2d 895, 897 (1976).
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ital obligation as a fundamental right, stating that "no court had
so extended the law." '
4. Irrebuttable Presumption
A final challenge to the constitutionality of marital disqualifi-
cation statutes was based on their tendency to presume conclu-
sively that one who terminates employment for marital, filial, or
domestic reasons is ineligible for employment benefits.11 By deny-
ing such claimants an individualized determination of their en-
titlement to a significant property right where the administrative
inconvenience of providing such a determination was negligible,
the irrebuttable presumption is said to violate due process.""
The Boren court utilized this analysis in its discussion of the
differential impact exerted by the probationary period require-
ment, which is designed to assess the degree to which the claim-
mant actually intends to rejoin the labor force." 8 While the dis-
qualification of the domestic claimant in Boren was perpetuated
until she had found a new job, those quitting for other kinds of
good cause regained eligibility by merely remaining in the labor
market or returning to it. 19 Although the state contended that this
aided the unemployment compensation system's focus on
economically-caused unemployment, the court noted that the sys-
tem did not bar other claimants whose unemployment stemmed
from non-economic causes.12O Citing to several United States
Supreme Court decisions striking down irrebuttable presump-
tions," '2 the Boren court noted that "the conclusive presumption
unduly penalizes the exercise of a basic liberty [marriage] and
115 Id.
116. Boren v. California Dep't of Employment Dev. 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 254, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683, 686
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Board of Review of Department of Labor, 413 I. 37, 41-42,
107 N.E.2d 832, 834-35 (1952); Shelton v. Phalen, 214 Kan. 54, 58-59, 519 P.2d 754, 758 (1974); Wallace
v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 38 Pa. Commw. 342, 345-46, 393 A.2d 43,
45 (1978); Chandler v. Department of Employment Sec., 678 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1984); Thomas v. Rut-
ledge, 280 S.E.2d 123, 127, 129 (W. Va. 1981).
117. Wallace, 38 Pa. Commw. at 351, 393 A.2d at 47.
118. Boren, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 259-60, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689. See supra notes 39 and 50 and accompanying
text.
119. Id. at 259-60, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
1203. Id. at 260, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689. Citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 61%, 633 (1969), the court
stated that, "[a] state may not preserve the fiscal integrity of its programs by invidious distinctions between
classes of citizens. When a statutory classification is subject to strict scrutiny, the state must do more than
show that the exclusion saves money." id. at 261, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90. (Strict scrutiny triggered by'the
fundamental right of marriage is similar to an irrebuttable presumption analysis as the latter is merely a form
of strict scrutiny applied only in cases involving a fundamental right.).
121. Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975), Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644, 646 (1974).
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denies due process." '2 For this reason, the California court
declared the statute a nullity.12
In Chandler v. Department of Employment Security,"' the
Supreme Court of Utah was faced with the consolidated appeal
of six claimants denied benefits under a statute 25 providing that
one who left work voluntarily to accompany, follow or join his
or her spouse to or in a new locality did so without good cause.1"'
Relying on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Vlandis
v. Kline,'27 the claimants contended that the statute created an ir-
rebuttable presumption prohibited by the due process and equal
protection clauses. 28 In reply, however, the court noted that Wein-
berger v. Salf,'29 had rejected such an analysis as an acceptable
approach in scrutinizing legislative classification in matters of so-
cial welfare.'" While referring to an earlier case in which a claim-
ant quit work to follow a spouse to school,' the court relied on
the same rationale 32 to find that the present classification bore
a rational relationship to the legitimate legislative goal of limit-
ing unemployment compensation to the involuntarily unem-
ployed.' In spite of its unfortunate effects on many families, the
classification was held to offend neither the state nor federal con-
stitution. "
Although a similar claim arose in Illinois Bell Telephone Com-
pany v. Board of Review,' the Supreme Court of Illinois reject-
ed the appellee's contention that a conclusive presumption of
unavailability violated the due process clause.'36 Stating that the
provision involved3 7 was a rule of substantive law laid down by
the legislature, the court found that the only factual question was
whether the employee voluntarily left employment for reasons
122. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 260, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
123. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 261, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
124. 678 P.2d 315 (1984).
125. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35--5(a) (Supp. 1986).
126. 678 P.2d at 317.
127. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
128. 678 P.2d at 317.
129. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
130. 678 P.2d at 317.
131. Child v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1983).
132. 678 P.2d at 318. The legislature could have reasonably determined that the state need not underwrite
the financial risks attendant on such a personal and voluntary choice. Id.
133. 687 P.2d at 318. Hence, claimants who left their jobs to follow spouses to a new location were denied
unemployment benefits regardless of necesessitious and compelling circumstances. Id.
134. Id.
135. 413 111. 37, 107 N.E.2d 832 (1952).
136. 413 Ill. at 42, 107 N.l.2d at 835.
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 6(c)(5)(B) (1949).
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related to her marital status.' 38 The court also rejected the Board's
contention that the statute violated the equal protection clause,
stating that "[a] statutory classification resting upon substantial
differences in kind, situation, or circumstance which are reasona-
bly related to the legislative purpose does not offend constitutional
prohibitions against special legislation or violate the equal pro-
tection clause.""' 9 Considering that the intent of the statute was
to relieve the economic distress caused by involuntary unemploy-
ment, the court held that a classification based upon the motive
which caused one voluntarily to leave work was reasonable and
did not offend equal protection.' °
In Shelton v. Phalen,'' the Kansas disqualification statute'4 2 un-
der siege conclusively presumed that employees leaving work due
to domestic or family responsibilities had withdrawn from the labor
market.' 3 In addition, the statute contained a provision which es-
tablished two classes of individuals. The first class, consisting
of those who terminated employment voluntarily, without good
cause, and for no particular reason, was disqualified from receiv-
ing benefits for six consecutive weeks.44 The second class, con-
sisting of those quitting for specified reasons, including domestic
or family responsibilities, was denied benefits until they regained
employment and earned eight times their weekly benefit amount.' 5
The state's rationale for the distinction between the two groups
was that those quitting for specific reasons had done so demon-
strating that they had withdrawn from the labor market, and that
requiring them to get a job and accrue minimum earnings was
a valid criterion for testing the bona fides of this re-entry into
the ranks of wage earners."" In its reply, however, the court stat-
ed that any irrebuttable presumption of unavailability would be
unconstitutional.'" But rather than strike the statute outright, the
court interpreted it as containing a procedure for the determina-
138. 413 Ill. at 42, 107 N.E.2d at 835, The court noted that such a rule of substantive law was to be distin-
guished from an evidentiary presumption where due process required a logical relationship between the fact
inferred and the fact proven. Id.
139. 413 111. at 43, 107 N.E.2d at 835.
140. Id. Although the statute at issue voided the disqualification upon the cessation of the marital circum-
stance (4"13 111. at 39-40, IM N.E.2d as $34) no atack -was made upon this pvo'visioo.
141. 214 Kan. 54, 519 P.2d 754 (1974).
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(a) (1981).
143. 214 Kan. at 59, 519 P.2d at 758.
144. Id. at 57, 519 P.2d at 757.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 58, 519 P.2d at 758.
147. Id. at 59, 519 P.2d at 758.
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tion of vocational withdrawal. '8
While the West Virginia statute' 9 in Thomas v. Rutledge5° was
rendered rebuttable on identical grounds, the provision in that case
rendered the marital claimant ineligible until he or she returned
to covered employment for a period of thirty working days."' By
contrast, those quitting for no reason at all could receive benefits
after a seven-week period regardless of re-employment."' Requir-
ing those quitting for domestic reasons to show their availability
for work in the same manner as others who had quit voluntarily
was found to provide no greater opportunity for fraudulent claims
and imposed no significant burden on existing hearing and ap-
peals procedures. 5 Because the need for individualized determi-
nations of entitlement outweighed the slight administrative
convenience inherent in the conclusive presumption of ineligibil-
ity, the failure to provide such determinations violated equal pro-
tection and due process." '
5. Summary
Although many of the modes of analysis and rationales adopt-
ed by the state courts have followed logically from the type of
statute at issue, there has also been surprising variability. While
Kistler?5' invalidated a disqualification statute 56 because the scheme
by which the benefits were determined lacked a rational basis," 7
Kantor" and Petterssen"9 held that a six-week period of proba-
tionary employment provided a reasonable means of removing
the disqualification. Pyeatt ° found that neutral wording alone ren-
dered the disqualification non-discriminatory6 . and held the dis-
148. Id. at 59-60, 519 P.2d at 758-59. Before a claimant could be disqualified on marital grounds, the court
required a determination as to whether the domestic or family responsibilities causing the termination, or her
subsequent conduct, were such that she must be deemed to have withdrawn. Id. at 60, 519 P.2d at 759. Be-
cause no such opportunity to rebut the presumption was granted below, the court reversed the denial of benefits
and remanded for this determination. Id. at 61, 519 P.2d at 759.
149. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(6) (1985).
150, 280 S.E.2d. 123 (W. Va. 1981)
151. Id. at 127.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 130.
154. Id. Accord, Wallace v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 38 Pa. Commw.
342, 393 A.2d 43 (1978). However, the presumption in Wallace was rendered rebuttable by striking it entirely.
Id. at 351, 393 A.2d at 47. Wallace also involved a resignation forced after a change in workshift, when no
caretaker could be found to care for her two young sons. Id. at 344-45, 393 A.2d at 44.
155. 192 Colo. 172, 556 P.2d 895 (1976); see supra notes 59-64, 114-15 and accompanying text.
156. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108(8)(a) (1973 and Supp. 1985) (repealed by L. 84, § 6, effective July 1, 1984).
157. 192 Colo. at 175, 556 P.2d at 897.
158. 286 Minn. 29, 32, 175 N.W.2d 188, 191; see supra notes 66-68, 72 and accompanying text.
159. 306 Minn. 542, 544, 236 N.W.2d 168, 169; see supra notes 69-71, 73 and accompanying text.
160. 98 Idaho 424, 565 P.2d 1381 (1977); see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
161. 98 Idaho at 425-26, 565 P.2d at 1382-83.
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couragement of voluntary termination without good cause to
rationally promote employment stability. 162 Gilman.6' and Guinn6
found that the greater economic disruption resulting from the un-
employment of the major family wage earner justified the differen-
tial impact exerted by the primary provider exception. Hence,
the resultant classification was not rendered sex-based by mere
numerical disparity in the work force." 5
Unlike Pyeatt, Boren"" focused on the statute's6 7 practical im-
pact rather than its neutral language. 68 Because the three suspect
classifications 16  were found not to serve a compelling state in-
terest, strict scrutiny was applied to invalidate them as a denial
of equal protection.170
While Kistler refused to consider the marital obligation a fun-
damental right,"" Boren adopted this as an additional reason for
applying a strict scrutiny analysis.172 Consequently, the harsher
penalty imposed upon claimants quitting their jobs because of fa-
mily obligations was held to restrict freedom of choice in matters
of marriage and family life, thus encroaching upon fundamental
liberties protected by due process.""
The probationary period requirement in Boren also focused its
punitive effect exclusively upon claimants quitting for domestic
reasons." Because the termination of such claimants was irrebut-
tably presumed to be without good cause, the court found a deni-
al of due process which rendered the statute invalid.' Rather than
striking their disqualification statutes outright, Shelton 6 and
Thomas77 preferred to render their presumptions rebuttable at an
administrative hearing. By contrast, Chandler7" found that its
162. 98 Idaho at 426, 565 P.2d at 1383.
163. 28 Pa. Commw. 630, 635-36, 369 A.2d 895, 898; see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
164. 33 Pa. Commw. 596, 599, 382 A.2d 503, 504; see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
165. Gilman, 28 Pa. Commw. at 634, 369 A.2d at 897; see also Guinn, 33 Pa. Commw. at 600-01, 382
A.2d at 505.
166.59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976): see supra notes 56-57, 96-113, 118-23,
and infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
167. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE. § 1264 (West 1972).
168. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 258, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
169. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 257-58, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87.
170. id. at 262, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
171. 192 Colo. at 174, 556 P.2d at 897.
172. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
173. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 260-61, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
174. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 258-60, 130 Cal Rptr. at 688-89.
175. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
176. 214 Kan. 54, 60, 519 P.2d 754, 759 (1974), construing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(a) (1981); see
supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
177. 280 S.E.2d 123, 130 (1981), construing W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(6) (1985); see supra notes 150-54
and accompanying text.
178. 678 P.2d 315 (1984), construing UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(a) (Supp. 1983); see supra notes 124-34
and accompanying text.
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presumption was a rational means of limiting unemployment
benefits to the involuntarily unemployed.179 Finally, Illinois Bell8°
upheld this statute18' by finding the conclusive presumption to be
a substantive rule of law not governed by the requirements of due
process. "'
179. Id. at 318.
180. 413 Ill. 37, 107 N.E.2d 832 (1952); see supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
181. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 6(c)(5)(B) (1949).
182. 413 I11. at 42, 107 N.E.2d at 835.
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IV. INSTANT CASE AND ANALYSIS
The task facing the Mississippi Supreme Court in Warren was
to evaluate a marked division of authority so as to determine the
constitutionality of the Mississippi marital disqualification sta-
tute.18 This statute prohibits the payment of unemployment benefits
to a wife who leaves the state to accompany her husband by provid-
ing that, "marital, filial, and domestic circumstances and obliga-
tions shall not be deemed good cause [for termination of
employment]."18' The statute also contains a re-entry provision
which denies benefits to such claimants until they regain employ-
ment and earn eight times their weekly benefit amount.18
Under this statute, married claimants are prevented from demon-
strating that marital, filial, and domestic circumstances can con-
stitute good cause for termination. ' By contrast, claimants quitting
work for other reasons can argue good cause.187 Warren claimed
that this differential treatment gives rise to a classification scheme
which bears no rational relationship to the legitimate state interest
of aiding "persons unemployed through no fault of their own."188
Because marital, filial, and domestic circumstances can never be
considered good cause for termination, she argued that an irrebut-
table presumption arises which violates the equal protection and
due process clauses. 189 Warren then sought to demonstrate the vi-
tality of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine by discussing var-
ious decisions which had relied upon it to invalidate similar state
statutes. 19o Because existing administrative procedures evaluated
whether other types of voluntary terminations had been for good
cause, Warren maintained that extending this privilege to those
quitting for marital reasons would impose no additional burden
on the Mississippi Employment Security Commission.191 She also
emphasized the tendency of the statute to operate almost exclu-
sively upon females and requested that the court note the percen-
tage of females disqualified by the Mississippi statute's
application. ""
183. Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(A)(l)(a) (1972 and Supp. 1985).
184. ld.
185. Id.
186. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, 8, Warren v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n,
463 So. 2d 1076 (1985).
187. See supra note 186, at 2, 8.
188. See supra note 186, at 2, 8.
189. See supra note 186, at 2-3, 8.
190. See supra note 186, at 3-7.
191. See supra note 186, at 3.
192. Appellant's Rebuttal Brief at 9, Warren v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n,
463 So. 2d 1076 (1985).
[Vol. 6:213
19861 MISSISSIPPI'S BENEFIT DISQUALIFICATION STATUTE 233
The Mississippi Employment Security Commission contend-
ed, first, that the decision of the Board of Review properly ap-
plied the law to the facts... and second, that the provisions of the
marital disqualification statute were a valid expression of state
legislative policy9 ' Arguing that an economic benefits statute such
as an unemployment compensation act did not involve a fundamen-
tal right, the Commission contended that the presence of some
rational justification in the act's legislative purpose protected the
conclusive presumption from effective constitutional attack.'95 The
Commission also traced the evolution of the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine and noted its apparent extinction except in cases in-
volving independent reasons for heightened scrutiny, as when
fundamental interests are involved.196 Because the state's Unem-
ployment Trust Fund would sustain significant losses if the pro-
vision at issue were invalidated, the Commission argued that the
legislature was well within its constitutional prerogative in estab-
lishing the social and economic bounds of this statutory scheme.' 97
Several cases were also discussed wherein similar statutes were
upheld in other jurisdictions. " 8
Deferring to the legislative will from the outset, Justice Hawkins
quoted Albritton v. City of Winona199 for the proposition that, "the
courts are without the right to substitute their judgment for that
of the Legislature as to . . .wisdom and policy ...unless it ap-
pears beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution." '
Accordingly, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the legis-
lature was the policymaker in determining whether or not it would
deny benefits to those choosing to accompany their spouses to
another locality.2' Acknowledging that the statute might occa-
sionally cause hardship, a unanimous court held that such was
not offensive to either the equal protection or due process provi-
sions of the state and federal constitutions."'2
Because of its brevity, the opinion of the Mississippi Supreme
Court is perhaps best understood by examining those roads not
taken. Although the Kistler"°3 court found the state's legitimate
193. Appellee's Reply Brief at 2, Warren v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n,
463 So. 2d 1076 (1985).
194. See supra note 193, at 3.
195. See supra note 193, at 3.
196. See supra note 193, at 6.
197. See supra note 193, at 11.
198. See supra note 193, at 4-5, 12.
199. 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938).
200. 463 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (1985).
201. Id. at 1077.
202. Id. at 1077.
203. 192 Colo. 172, 556 P.2d 895 (1976).
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interest in benefitting conscientious individuals adequately
preserved by the requirement that one be actively seeking and
available for employment, "°4 the Mississippi Supreme Court ap-
peared unwilling to stake treasury dollars on this assumption. By
adopting the lenient and deferential minimum rationality standard,
the unity of the marital relation was denied the status of a fun-
damental liberty and relegated to consideration as a mere personal
and voluntary choice." 5
Although the factual circumstances are distinguishable from
those of the instant case in that paternal obligations conflicted with
a proposed change of workshift, "°' the ruling of the California
Court of Appeals in Boren 7 presented the ideological antithesis
of the case at bar.0" Because the California statute0 9 disqualified
women as a class and extended their disqualification beyond that
of claimants quitting for good cause, that court applied strict scru-
tiny to invalidate the classification as a denial of equal protection."'
Unlike the court in Boren, the Mississippi Supreme Court ap-
peared unwilling to consider statistical evidence of sexual discrimi-
nation, despite the claimant's emphatic request. 11 Instead, the court
complacently deferred to the legislative will, accepting whatever
flaws it contained in order to preserve the integrity of the state
fisc. " 2 If the Mississippi statistics are similar to those judicially
noticed in Boren, the Mississippi Supreme Court will have dis-
qualified a majority of female citizens from benefit eligibility.
While the cannibalization of social needs to promote economic
stability is an ancient governmental process whereby limited
resources are expended in such a manner as to best benefit as many
citizens as possible, this blind indifference to the needs of a sub-
stantial class of individuals implies a counter-majoritarian con-
ception of popular sovereignty. In addition, the deliberate
avoidance of social reality is a surprising posture to be assumed
by an institution committed to careful logical analysis.
Another major aspect of the Mississippi statute is its conclu-
sive presumption that termination of employment for marital, filial,
and domestic reasons can never constitute good cause entitling
the claimant to unemployment benefits.21 By contrast, claimants
204. 192 Colo. at 175, 556 P.2d at 898.
205. 463 So. 2d at 1077.
206. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 254, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
207. 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
208. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
209. CAL. UNESIP. INS. CODE. § 1264 (West 1972).
210. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
211. See supra note 192, at 9.
212. 463 So. 2d at 1077.
213. MIss. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(A)(I)(a) (1972 and Supp. 1985).
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who terminate employment for other reasons are provided an op-
portunity to demonstrate good cause. "1' By upholding this irrebut-
table presumption, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the
legislature to be justifiably focusing finite state resources on those
who became unemployed through no fault of their own.215
Although the courts in Shelton,216 Thomas. 7 and Wallace18 sal-
vaged their statutes by rendering their presumptions rebuttable
at an administrative hearing, the Mississippi Supreme Court ap-
peared to be in no mood for such a compromise. Declining to
mandate that an individual determination be made as to whether
a claimant had actually withdrawn from the labor market due to
domestic or family responsibilities, the court held that the state
need not underwrite the financial uncertainties of voluntary un-
employment, whatever its under-lying cause.219
V. CONCLUSION
In the present opinion, the Mississippi Supreme Court rebuffed
allegations of sexual discrimination and rejected the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine as a means of invalidating the Mississippi
marital disqualification statute. Adopting the view of the more
conservative jurisdictions, the court also refused to view the marital
obligation as a fundamental liberty, render the presumption of
unavailability rebuttable, or even consider statistical evidence of
the statute's operation. By judicially endorsing the conclusive and
irrebuttable presumption that all who terminate employment volun-
tarily do so without good cause, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has sealed the state treasury from those said to willingly cast them-
selves upon the unemployment rolls. The resulting injustice to
a substantial class of individuals is viewed as a necessary evil ra-
tionally related to the economic survival of those becoming un-
employed through no fault of their own.
E. Scott Lowicki
215. 463 So. 2d at 1077.
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219. Warren v. Board of Review of Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 463 So. 2d at 1077.

